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By Ekkehart Schlicht, Darmstadt 
But  in  recent  years,  thoughtful  opinion  has  been 
tending to place less emphasis on  efficiency in achiev- 
ing objectives taken for granted, and to give increasing 
weight to this other question of  the type of  objectives 
generated and the general philosophy of  life inculated 
in  people. 
F.  H. Knight (1925) 
Introduction 
The aim of  the present essay is to introduce the economist to some re- 
cent developments in social psychology (sections 1 - 3), to hint at some 
applications (section 4)  and to adress to the broader issue of  a psycho- 
logical foundation of  welfare economics. The general proposition is that 
we can gain much by replacing the premise of  utility maximization by 
the premise of  the maximization of  cognitive consistency: The latter of- 
fers more structure, is more fundamental in the sense that it is able to 
explain changes in preferences, and has an impressive empirical sup- 
port in the psychological literature. It is able to explain phenomena like 
altruism and the obedience of  rules without assuming a preference for 
altruism or law-obedience in advance. Hence it might contribute to the 
analysis of  the moral basis of  economics -  working morals, business 
morals, tax morals, the observation of  property  rights, etc. -  which 
constitutes  an  important  ingredient  regarding  the  efficiency  of  any 
economic system. 
1.  The Perspective of  Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
1.1. The Face-saving Motive 
In microeconomics we are accustomed to think of  individual actions 
as determined by tastes and constraints, where tastes are described by 
utility functions. Hence the actions of  the individuals are explained by 
saying that they are the most preferred among the feasible actions, the 
prototype decision being that among chocolate and bread. 62  Ekkehart Schlicht 
This type of  argument can also be used  in cases where desires less 
"direct"  than hunger are concerned: Assume the individual has a de- 
sire to appear to himself as an approvable human being. This is certain- 
ly a possibility, and this kind of  taste will explain e. g. altruistic beha- 
viour  even in cases where nobody can observe it such as anonymous 
charity contributions. Virtue is its own reward in these cases. 
This "face-saving  motive"  is, however, not  that unimportant  as it 
might appear at first sight if one looks at examples like charity, tipping, 
and the like: It is obviously very important for the efficiency of  any 
economic system that people obey the rules even if  unobserved  since 
this saves control costs, and  their desire to  appear  to  themselves as 
law-abiding citizens is a very important economic asset and can be con- 
sidered as a kind of  social capital -  one might speak of  "moral capital" 
just  in the same sense as v. Weizsacker speaks of  the "organizational 
capital"  of  a  society  as  embodying  the  value  of  the  organizational 
structures present  within an economy (v. Weizsacker 1971). One need 
not go as far as Arrow who maintains that the rules prerequisite to the 
very functioning of  the market system -  in particular the observation 
of  property rights -  are not self-enforcing but require a separate legal 
system which enforces them (Arrow 1972, p. 357)'. 
Even if  this were not the case, the efficiency gains associated with the 
reduction of  control costs in presence of  adequate morals could be sub- 
stancial, whereas control costs could easily become prohibitively large 
if people were not intrinsically motivated to behave appropriately, and 
the market system might become very inefficient as compared to other 
systems of  social organization in this case. 
1.2.  The Theory of  Cognitive Dissonance 
Psychologists argue that the face-saving motive is not just a taste like 
that for chocolate, but is an aspect of  a more fundamental drive com- 
mon to all human beings. In the words of  a prominent proponent, "this 
1 In fact, u. Weizsacker (1980, pp. 72 - 76) has argued that, in an idealized 
utopian framework at least, one  might  think of  law-abiding behaviour  as 
arising from private utility maximization without reliance on legal punish- 
ment as long as the individuals expect mutually that those who are observed 
as  behaving  unlawfully  will  violate  the  rules  with  a  higher  probability 
in the future ("extrapolation principle"), and  the costs  involved  will  out- 
weight the potential  gains from behaving unlawfully. This argument  pre- 
supposes that offenses will be  detected with some positive probability, the 
time preference is zero and  the planning horizon  as well  as the expected 
life-span  is  infinite.  Furthermore,  the  extrapolative  formation  of  expec- 
tations (extrapolation principle) as well  as a given system of  rules is to be 
presupposed. Cognitive Dissonance in Economics  63 
theory of  cognitive dissonance assumes the existence of  a basic tendency 
within each individual toward consistency of  cognitions about oneself 
and one's environment".  (Zimbardo 1969, p. 15)2.  Hence if  I think of  my- 
self  as being an altruistic being (this being my "self-cognition")  I will 
run into cognitive dissonance if I observe myself behaving inconsistently 
by not  making  the  charity  contribution.  In order  to  avoid  this  dis- 
sonance, I will make the gift. 
Similarly, if  I think of  myself as observing certain principles (work- 
ing properly, being honest, not littering the streets) I will behave ac- 
cordingly even if this involves some costs. The internal costs associated 
with the dissonance aroused by behaving otherwise would be larger. 
1.3.  Principles, Circumstances, and Adequacy 
Cognitively consistent -  as opposed to dissonant -  behaviour means 
that one can provide justification  for the behaviour which is convincing 
to oneself. Hence the individual can give reasons. These reasons involve 
the application of  certain principles of  action  to given circumstances. 
Statements like "I did it for money .  .  .", "I  did it not for money" (im- 
plying some other suggested cause), "I did it to help others .  .  .", "I did it 
to avoid punishment .  .  .", "I  have always handled  these matters like 
that", all involve the application of  principles to certain circumstances. 
However, the invoked principles ought to be appropriate under the given 
circumstances in order that the justification be convincing. The general 
picture of  behaviour looks like that: There is a set of  principles P and 
a set of  circumstances S. The thesis is that for any given situation s  E S 
the principle p E P is chosen which appears as the most adequate, and 
actual behaviour is following this principle of  action. The crucial thing 
is, of  course, how the degree of  adequacy a @,  s) is determined. If  we 
have such a measure, however, the action selected will follow a principle 
which involves the smallest degree of  cognitive dissonance. The view 
described here amounts to the thesis that "utility"  is not derived from 
the actions independently of  their meaning to the individual but rather 
from their degree of  cognitive consistency, from their very meaning. 
This is somewhat more restrictive than (although not inconsistent with) 
maintaining that everything is just  the result of  utility maximization 
without saying anything more, since it involves additional restrictions 
2 The basic  reference to  cognitive  dissonance theory  is  Fesfinger (1957). 
We  need  not bother about  whether this motivating force towards psycho- 
logical consistency is culturaIIy conditioned or  innate, since it seems  to  be 
universally  present  at  least  in  the  western  cultures.  Gestalt  psychology 
suggests that it might be innate to a certain extend -  due to the organiza- 
tion of  the brain brought forth natural selection. 64  Ekkehart Schlicht 
stemming  from  the  psychological  regularities  of  concept  formation, 
cognition, and learning. 
The following sections will elaborate on these restrictions. 
2.  Determinants of  Adequacy 
2.1.  Intrinsic Simplicity 
Principles are rules, and rules ought to be simple. Consider the se- 
quence of  numbers 
This sequence will be memorized and reproduced by means of  the rule 
(2)  X.  I = -  xi-1,  x1 =  3 ,  i =  1,2,3,4 
although 
(3)  xi =45 -  68i+30iz--4ia  i=  1,2,3,4 
would do as well and many other formulas are conceivable. This illu- 
strates the psychological fact that the human mind tends to maximize 
simplicity -  we observe an optimizing process in data processing car- 
ried out by our mind spontaneously. This is the old "law of  pragnanz" 
of  Gestalt Psychologys. 
Hence  a rule is particularly  adequate if  it is as simple as possible. 
This depends, of  course, on the items to which it is to apply. 
For instance: If  we are confronted with the sequence 
it might be still adequate to  describe it by  the rule (2)  and by  the 
"exception" 
and this way of  conceptualizing it will usually be adopted4.  This method 
will become  inefficient, however,  if  we  are confronted  with the se- 
quence 
Here it might be advisable to think it governed by the rule 
3  See Schlicht (1979) for another example and for references. By  the way 
the law of  pragnanz has been observed to operate within animals, too. 
4  In terms of  Piaget's learning theory, this would  be  an "assimilation". Cognitive Dissonance in Economics  65 
together with the initial law (2) or by formula (3)5. However, too com- 
plicated rules will be unintelligible even for the trained brain and will 
cease to "make sense". In order that a principle be adequate, it ought to 
make sense, however. Hence it ought to be simple intrinsically. 
2.2.  Reciprocative Consistency 
The question of whether a principle makes sense is not tied simply to 
its intrinsic simplicity but also to its consequences. The central argu- 
ment used here is highlighted by the test underlying Kant's Categorical 
Imperative:  Will the universal  application  of  a  given principle  to  a 
given set of  situations be feasible and desirable -  is it possible that 
everybody applies this principle under the specified circumstances, and 
will the social outcome resulting from that be approvable?6 
If  this consideration leads to an answer in the affirmative, this will 
offer an argument which increases the adequacy of  a given principle. 
Most of  the legal and customary rules we are concerned with derive their 
justification from that kind of  reasoning: This is the main reason for 
driving at the right-hand side of  the road or of  not littering the street. 
The justification  is given by  asking:  "What  would  the traffic, or the 
streets, look like if anybody cared about these rules!",  and this is taken 
as a justification  although it is logically indefensible, strictly speaking: 
There are usually other rules or means leading to the same result (driv- 
ing strictly on the left, employing more scavengers),  and the overall 
outcome might even be improved from the point of  view of  an individ- 
ual behaving as a free rider:  disregarding the rules which all others 
obey. 
2.3.  Personal Consistency7 
Assume that an individual has to decide whether to obey a certain 
principle or not -  not throwing litter away or doing so for instance. If 
he has followed the rule in similar situations in the past  and decides 
5  In  terms  of  Piaget's  learning theory  the  change  from  (2)  to  (7) con- 
stitutes an  "accomodation"; in terms of  Gestalt psychology, it is a Gestalt 
switch; in terms of  Kuhn's conceptualization of  the progress of  science, this 
is a change of  paradigm. 
6  This feature is the main concern of  many investigations in ethics, com- 
pare e. g. Hare (1952). 
7  This section summarizes some results of  "attribution theory" and "com- 
mitment theory" in psychology from the point of  view of  dissonance theory. 
See on  that Irk (1975). On  the comparison between  attribution theory  and 
cognitive dissonance theory, see also Stroebe and Diehl  (1981). 
5 Schriften d. Vereins f. Socialpolitik 141 66  Ekkehart Schlicht 
now not to follow it, this warrants explanation: Why has he behaved 
differently in the past, and what has been wrong with his previous rea- 
soning? Or is the present situation significantly different, and in which 
respect? These questions ought to be answered convincingly in order to 
avoid the dissonance between past and present behaviour, but this dis- 
sonance will not be aroused if  he behaves as he did in the past. Hence 
a principle will appear more  adequate to the individual in a certain 
situation if it is consistent with what the individual did in the past. 
Another, although  closely related, aspect of  personal  consistency is 
that the action ought to be consistent with the self-image the individual 
fosters: If  he thinks of  himself as being a tidy person, this view of  him- 
self cannot be easily reconciled with littering, for instance. On the other 
hand, if  the individual thinks of  himself as being a spontaneous human 
being disregarding bureaucratic rules, these problems would not be that 
important. The self-image, however, can be only convincing if  it is in 
accordance with past behaviour: If  I have littered throughout my life, I 
will run into cognitive dissonance if  I still want to think of  myself  as 
being tidy, and the theory of cognitive dissonance would predict that I 
choose another self-image more compatible with my past behaviour. The 
striving for personal  consistency is witnessed  by  the phenomenon  of 
"selective exposure to new inf~rmation"~:  One can observe a systematic 
tendency to depreciate new information which is dissonant with past 
behaviour and to accept new information which is in corroboration of  it. 
In  a  similar vein, the  "forced  compliance paradigm"  stresses that 
people change their attitudes and preferences in order to gain personal 
consistency:  "Subjects  whose initial  attitude toward  eating Japanese 
grasshoppers was one of  strong dislike reported liking them more and 
approved  of  more  strongly  worded  personal  endorsements  for  them 
after having eaten some at the request of  a disliked, negatively evalu- 
ated communicator,  as compared  to the attitude change of  eaters re- 
sponding to the inducement of  a positive communicator and of  Controls 
not given the experimental treatmentHg.  The argument is that a positive 
communicator might serve as an explanation for eating those animals 
whereas a negative communicator will not. In the latter case the indi- 
viduals are induced to develop another explanation for eating them by 
6  Festinger (1964, pp. 22,30); Irle (1975, pp. 320 - 327). 
9 Zimbardo  (1969, p.264 f.).  The  studies collected in  this book  exemplify 
that the forced compliance  paradigm is  very powerful  indeed:  It offers  a 
unified  explanation  for  changes  in  attitudes  and  in  behaviour  even  for 
physiological  phenomena  associated  with  hunger  and  stress, for  instance. 
Zimbardo  (1969, p.270)  remarks: "However, while it is possible to erect  an 
alternative theoretical explanation to account for the results of  any one ex- 
periment  or subset of  them, only  dissonance theory  can satisfactorily and 
parsimoniously account for all of  them." Cognitive Dissonance in Economics  67 
changing their attitudes such as to reduce the dissonance aroused by ob- 
serving themselves eating something disliked without any reason. 
Another class of  investigations, related to the forced compliance para- 
digm, is extremely relevant to economics. It deals with the "detrimental 
effect of  reward'!lO: The general finding is that the intrinsic motivation 
to do certain things is lessened if a reward is given to these activities. 
In terms of  cognitive dissonance theory the reward, and the fact of  ac- 
cepting it, is interpreted by the individual as being the main motive 
leading the behaviour,  and the intrinsic motivation is destroyed:  The 
individual starts seeing itself as being extrinsically rather than intrinsi- 
cally motivated. The forced compliance phenomenon demonstrates that 
this can be reversed: By getting somebody to do something with mini- 
mal incentive, this will create intrinsic motivation. 
The selective  exposure,  forced compliance and detrimental  reward 
phenomena show that the history of  the individual -  or of  the group 
of  individuals we are dealing with -  is an important aspect in the de- 
termination of  the degree of  personal consistency: Selective exposure 
and forced compliance  contribute to our understanding of  habit per- 
sistence, and the detrimental effect  of  reward  will lead to the result 
that the intrinsic motivation to follow a certain rule of  behaviour will 
be absent if  the behaviour has been rewarded directly in the past. 
2.4.  Social Consistency 
If  somebody says: "This grass is red", I will look twice. If  I still per- 
ceive it as green, I will experience cognitive dissonance since I have to 
answer for  myself  the questions:  "Why  may  our perception  differ?" 
"Why does the other pretend to perceive the grass as being red?" etc. 
A similar problem will arise if  I perceive somebody similar to me but 
acting differently from me under similar circumstances. This involves 
dissonance: I have to supply myself with an explanation why the other 
differs from me or why he is really  acting under  different circum- 
stances. 
It will be particularly hard to answer these questions in cases where 
I know that the other is an expert acting under the same conditions as I 
do: If  an expert mathematician arrives at results contradicting my con- 
clusions, the most convincing explanation is that my reasoning has been 
erroneous, and the force of  this explanation will become overwhelm- 
ingly strong if  many expert mathematicians  agree with their collegue 
but disagree with me. Without knowing their arguments I will be fairly 
convinced that I have made an error and that they are right. 
10 See Lepper and Greene (1978). I owe this reference to Frey and Stroebe 
(1981). 68  Ekkehart Schlicht 
If  I am bound, as an engineer, to make use of  one of  the contradicting 
results and have no time to check them, it will be a good  strategy to 
base my construction on the expert's  advice  rather than on my own 
considerations. 
Similarly many possible explanations for my acting differently from 
a vast and heterogeneous majority will be very weak since it is very 
probable that many individuals in the majority are better in problem- 
solving than I am, have more experience, and are acting under similar 
or even more unfavorable circumstances. Acting differently from the 
majority implies that I have to give reasons why I am better in asses- 
sing arguments or why my case is an exception. A reason could be that I 
passed better judgements than the majority in the past, but to supply 
evidence for that will be very hard, usually, and the hypothesis that 
the majority is acting correctly is very convincing in most cases. 
Hence a principle of  action will be deemed the more appropriate, the 
more it is accepted within my reference group, i. e. by those I think are 
acting under comparable circumstances and with sufficient competence. 
Reference group behaviour avoids the cognitive dissonance associated 
with acting differently from the reference group, it leads to what might 
be called "social consistency" for the present purposes". 
3.  Consistency vs. Utility Maximization 
3.0  Introduction 
There is a large body of  psychological research dealing with the issues 
touched up to now, and it is beyond the scope of the present essay to 
give a satisfactory reviewis. I will offer only illustrative examples in 
this chapter stressing the relevance of  the features of  simplicity, reci- 
procative consistency, personal consistency, and social consistency (sec- 
tions 3.1. - 3.4.)  and contrasting these views with simple utility maxi- 
mization. 
3.1.  Simplicity 
Consider the experiment by Giith (1983) reported in this volume. The 
task has been to divide 12 pages of  arithmetic work between two ano- 
nymous subjects. One of  them (C) has a pocket calculator, and the other 
11 Some  consequences  of  reference  group  behaviour  for  the  efficacy  of 
economic incentives are developed in ~chlicht  (1981). The distinction between 
personal  consistency  and  social  consistency  is  closely  akin  to  Riesman's 
(1950) distinction between  "inner-directed" and "outer-directed" behaviour. 
However, the present approach has the advantage of  saying something about 
the factors strengthening or weaking the one or the other type of  behaviour. 
12 If any reader is interested in getting acquainted with the subject, the 
comprehensive review by  Irle  (1975) is recommended. Cognitive Dissonance in Economics  69 
(NC) is not allowed to use one. The one with the pocket calculator has to 
decide  about the division  of  work.  The simple principles of  division 
coming to the mind spontaneously are 
Number of  pages 
solved by 
C  NC 
--- 
................  1.  Minimization  of  own  effort  0  12 
................  2.  Minimization  of  joint  effort  12  0 
....................  3.  Equal  division  of  pages  6  6 
..................  4.  Equal  division  of  effort13  10  2 
Many randomly  assigned couples of  subjects have been  studied by 
Giith and he gives the frequency of  pages chosen by the C-subjects in 
his paper. 
The  experimental outcome shows pronounced  peaks  at  the results 
corresponding to the application of  the principles 2.  and 4.  and a less 
pronounced peak  at principle  1. The equal division  of  pages has not 
been used as a means of  allocating work -  obviously this formal sym- 
metry principle makes not very much sense in the given  asymmetric 
setting. What is to be noted, however, is that there is a pronounced dent 
in between (10.2) and (12.0). This makes it difficult to explain the ob- 
served behaviour in terms of  simple utility maximization with altruism: 
If  the individual  utility  function  were u(n) +  a.  v (12 -  n) where n 
stands for the number  of  pages  to be completed, u is the individual 
utility of  the decision maker, v is the utility of  the individual who has 
to do the rest of  the work, and a is a parameter of  altruism, we would 
expect a to be distributed smoothly and regularly, and this would give 
rise to a smooth and regular distribution of  n rather than to the patho- 
logical distribution which turned out from the experimentI4. 
Hence this experiment indicates that the consideration of  principles 
is not  superfluous but is  able to  grasp phenomena  more  easily  than 
simple utility maximization under neglect of  cognitive elements. It adds 
structure. 
13 These  numbers are  derived  by  taking  the  closed  integer  to  m  from 
equation (46) in Giifh  (1982)  and by using the arithmetic mean of  qi  instead of 
the qi's. Taking the mode leads to the same result; taking the geometric mean 
leads to  (10.5, 1.5). The  dispersion  of  the q(s  will  induce  some  dispersion 
here, of  course. 
14 I owe this argument to Reinhard Selfen. 70  Ekkehart Schlicht 
The aspect of  simplicity is very important in economics, too:  If  we 
talk about the reputation of  a firm, the formation of  expectations, etc. 
we  are implicitly  alluding to  inductive  reasoning  which seems to be 
impossible without the concept of  simplicity as the very basis  of  the 
notion of  regularityI6. 
3.2.  Reciprocative Consistency 
In a  famous study Titmuss has compared the systems of  voluntary 
blood donors and of  commercial blood markets as alternative means for 
the procurement of  blood needed for transfusion1@.  He argues that in a 
commercialized system a rather high price of  blood is required to pro- 
duce the same supply as under a pure system of  voluntary blood donors 
even if  voluntary blood donors are possible in the commercialized sy- 
stem, too. (Titmuss 1973,  pp. 51,  178,  232.) This implies that the intro- 
duction of  a market reduces supply absolutely as long as the price is 
moderate. 
As Arrow (1972,  p. 350) has remarked, this is puzzling to the econo- 
mist: "Thus, if  to a voluntary blood donor system we add the possibility 
of  selling blood, we have only expanded the individual's range of  alter- 
natives. If  he derives satisfaction from giving, it is argued, he can still 
give and nothing has been  done to impair that  right."  Still it seems 
to be true that the introduction of  a blood  market reduces the supply 
of  blood  at moderate prices:  Some will cease to  give their blood  al- 
though they could get money for it17. From the point of  view developed 
in this paper, the phenomenon could be explained by looking at reci- 
procative consistency under the different regimes: 
Without  a blood  market the argument would be:  Blood  is needed. 
But how could the necessary blood be procured if  everybody refused to 
act as a donor?  And  what would  happen to me  if  I needed  a trans- 
fusion? So it will be difficult to reject giving a suggested blood  dona- 
tion unless specific circumstances like impaired health stand against it. 
However, if  a blood market exists, this argument will brake down since 
15  There are infinitely many mutually contradicitive predictions about the 
future course of  the series  (6)  compatible with the data given  there  if  we 
do  not  resort  to  the notion  of  simplicity, for instance. On  the problem  of 
simplicity in induction, see  also  Harrod  (1956). For  further  discussion see 
Schlicht  (1979). 
$6 Titmuss (1973). He concentrates on Great Britain (voluntary system) and 
the  United  States  (commercialized  system), but  he  discusses  the  systems 
of  many other countries, too. 
17 This is highlighted by  the phenomenon that the social structure of  the 
donor population  corresponds roughly  to  that of  society whereas the poor 
are  significantly  overrepresented  if  a  market  is  introduced,  see  Titmuss 
(1973, pp. 144, 120). Cognitive Dissonance in Economics  71 
there is the alternative means of  blood procurement through the mar- 
ket.  Hence we  are not forced to rely on the doubtful  argument that 
Englishmen are more altruistic than Americans18. We shall come back 
to the Titmuss example in the following sections. 
3.3.  Personal Consistency 
The striving for  personal  consistency  is present  whenever  people 
behave differently from what can be considered  as straightforeward 
utility  maximization:  Making  a  charity  contribution  without  being 
observed (the example we started with), giving a tip to a taxi driver 
or a waiter in a foreign country, helping a child, making a correct tax 
return, not stealing even if  unobserved. 
It is tempting to explain these phenomena by assuming, in a Freudian 
vein, that people try to avoid by these acts having a "bad conscience" 
as a consequence of  acting against the norms implanted in their "super 
ego". According to this view, "id"  and "ego"  strive for utility maximiza- 
tion  (the id aiming  at immediate  pleasure, the ego  channalling this 
according to the constraints of  reality) and the super ego establishes 
additional constraints which have been learned through a habitualiza- 
tion process of  conscience. Experiments, however, have not confirmed 
this view; it has been shown that the observation of  certain norms is 
not a stable trait of  the character but is heavily  dependent upon the 
specific situation the individual is acting inlo. The theory of  cognitive 
18 cf. Arrow  1972,  p. 350. By  the way, Marshall  (1924,  p. 637)  pointed to this 
when he wrote: "And again increased earnestness in our care for the poor 
may make charity more lavish, or may  destroy the need  for  some  of  its 
forms altogether." 
19  Colby and Kohlberg  (1978,  pp. 349 - 351). The most dramatic example in 
this direction is given by the studies of Milgram  (1965): Subjects were given 
a small amount of  money in advance for participating in a "learning experi- 
ment"  ostensibly  designed  to  study the effect of  punishment on  memory. 
Subjects are informed that one member of  a pair  will  serve as a  teacher 
and one as a learner. The teacher is instructed to administer electric shocks 
to the learner of  increasing intensity whenever the learner fails to memo- 
rize certatin words correctly. The learner, according to the plan, is a col- 
laborator of  the experimenter and gives many wrong answers, and the naive 
teacher is required  to  give him  electric shocks up  to  375 Volts  which  are 
declared as extremely dangerous. The finding has been that a very large per- 
centage of  subjects were prepared to administer those severe punishments 
although they heard the protest, the cries, and the final agony of  the lear- 
ners (which were  simulated, however). Although the subjects were  free to 
leave the  experiment, and  knew  that,  and  although they  suffered severe 
feelings of  guilt, they continued the experiment on the simple demand of  the 
experimenter "You have no other choice, you must go on!". The explanation 
for this finding rests on that the subjects have been put in a situation where 
the "correct" way of  behaviour has been to obey the accepted rules although 
the  consequences  had  been  unclear  in  advance  and  where  it  has  been 
extremely difficult  for  the  subjects to  find  appropriate  principles  of  be- 72  Ekkehart Schlicht 
dissonance  makes this  understandable  since it  stresses the  cognitive 
elements which are dependent on the situation and it offers a point of 
view which explains what otherwise might appear as blind habituation 
of  utility functions or conscience. The phenomena of  selective exposure 
to new information and attitude changes brought about by forced com- 
pliance stress the relevance of  personal consistency from another angle, 
as has been mentioned in section 2.3. 
3.4.  Social Consistency 
If  we  observe people imitating others without  any other apparent 
reason than just to imitate, this could be interpreted in a utility max- 
imizing framework by postulating  a preference  for  conformity.  From 
the point  of  view of  cognitive dissonance, however, this  kind of  be- 
haviour is "rational"  in the sense that people rely on the judgement  of 
others by making their own judgement -  it is  an example of  what 
Keynes called a "conventional j~dgement"~0.  It is rational if the indi- 
vidual can assume the others to be at least as good informed as he is. 
By relying on their judgement  he can save the costs involved in eval- 
uating the alternatives, and he can benefit from their perhaps superior 
knowledge. 
However, according to cognitive dissonance theory the individual will 
cease behaving as the others do if  he has reasons to believe that he is 
better informed.  Hence  the theory  of  cognitive  dissonance is able to 
explain deviations from conformity: it is able to explain, so to speak, 
shifts in the utility function: an increase or decrease in the preference 
for conformity. Hence, again, it goes beyond simple utility maximiza- 
tion. 
Returning to this Titmuss example, we can see that the striving for 
social consistency might contribute to the understanding of  the puzzling 
phenomenon that the introduction of  a blood market induces a previous 
donator to give no blood at all:  If  he gave blood  as an unpaid donor, 
he would run into the problem of  needing an explanation why others 
in a similar situation get money for it, and vice versa. This dissonance 
can be avoided by not giving blood at all. 
haviour justifying a breaking off  of  the experiment, but under other circum- 
stances they would have behaved quite differently. By  the way these findings 
contradict a simple utility maximization hypothesis flatly. For  a discussion 
of  this and related experiments, see IrZe  (1975, pp. 469 -  475). 
20  Keynes (1973, p. 114). Cognitive Dissonance in Economics 
4.  Aspects of  Cognitive Dissonance in Economics 
4.0  Introduction 
This  section  discusses, somewhat  informally,  some  applications  of 
cognitive dissonance theory to economic problems. Section 4.1.  adresses 
to the central proposition of  the stability of  utility functions presup- 
posed  in conventional economics; section 4.2.  reports on some related 
studies  in the economic literature;  in  section  4.3.  it is  argued  that 
cognitive dissonance theory might  contribute to  an understanding of 
the welfare  effects of  freedom which escape traditional welfare eco- 
nomics; section 4.4. presents an example which indicates that our under- 
standing of  the interrelationship between political  and economic pro- 
cesses might be improved  considerably by using cognitive  dissonance 
theory; and in section 4.5.  it is argued that the subject of  welfare eco- 
nomics  will  undergo  a  fundamental, and healthy, change, if  the in- 
sights gained from social psychology are taken for serious. 
4.1.  The Instability of  Utility Functions 
The economist is used  to  explain many phenomena  by  starting to 
assume utility functions which the individuals are assumed to maximize. 
This explains the actions and interactions among the individuals and 
determines the final outcome 
utility  +  actions  -t  outcome 
As  long as the utility functions can be assumed  to be stable with 
regard to the speed of  the process leading to the outcome, this argument 
can be used even if  we are convinced that social psychology and espe- 
cially cognitive dissonance theory might  contribute to explaining the 
particular shape of  the preferences we are assuming. 
If  there is, however, a feedback from the outcome to the preferences, 
the utility functions can not be taken as data of  the analysis: 
utility  + actions  +  outcome 
t  1 
It is not legitimate to take utility as given and to fix it under a ceteris- 
paribus clausez1. In order to arrive at a correct result we have to take 
into account a feedback from outcomes to preferences.  Hence we need 
21  In  my  terminology  (Schlicht  1977, chapter 1),  the  "isolation principle" 
is violated  and the ceteris paribus clause is inadequate safe for purely ex- 
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a theory of  preference formation for these problems. The present aim 
is to supply tools which might he helpful here. 
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests, however, that preferences  are 
dependent  upon  economic circumstances in some important  cases - 
the Titmuss study e.g. offers the example that the introduction  of  a 
market  (a policy  measure) changes preferences,  and  the detrimental 
effect of  reward is another instance where economic incentives might 
change preferences directly. 
In all these cases, preferences cannot be taken as being stable with 
regard  to the processes  they  ought  to  explain.  Cognitive  dissonance 
theory suggests that the striving for consistency is the stable point of 
departure here:  We  can take this as given even in cases where  pre- 
ferences are unstable. 
4.2. Notes on the Literature 
1. The striving for personal consistency leads, via selective exposure 
to new information and the forced compliance phenomenon, to a change 
in preferences  reconfirming the status quo.  This argument has been 
used by Hirshman (1965) with regard to attitude changes toward mod- 
ernization in the course of  de~elopment*~.  It has been used by Akerlof 
and Dickens (1982, pp. 310 - 315) with regard to attitude changes towards 
hazardous jobs,  social security, and innovation, and  it has been  em- 
ployed by von Weizsacker  (1982, pp. 28 - 29)  with  regard  to environ- 
mental preservation. Schlicht (1980, p. 162) has used the argument as a 
means of  criticizing a sociological wage theory. 
2.  The drive towards personal consistency leads, furthermore, to the 
phenomenon that severe punishment  will be a sufficient  explanation 
for not doing a certain offense, whereas a mild punishment will require 
that individuals develop an intrinsic motivation against committing the 
offense (this is the same argument as that underlying the detrimental 
effect of  reward). It has been pointed out by Akerlof and Dickens (1982) 
that this implies a strong objection against the approach taken by the 
Chicago economists to the economics of  crime. Frey and Stroebe (1981) 
point  out  that  the "pay-for-housework"  proposal  might  be  counter- 
productive due to the detrimental effect of  reward. 
3. The striving for social consistency leads to individual behaviour 
which is in conformity with the behaviour  observed  in the reference 
group.  One  important  consequence  of  reference  group  behaviour  is 
well-known from Duesenberry's (1949) study of  the consumption func- 
22  I owe this reference to Ake~lof  and Dickens (1982, p. 307). Cognitive Dissonance in Economics  75 
tion*.  Schlicht  (1981) has  demonstrated  that  this  kind  of  behaviour 
increases rather than decreases  the effectiveness of  economic  incen- 
tives. 
4.  If  an individual  is  faced  with  alternatives  which  seem equally 
attractive, a state of  cognitive  dissonance arises:  One needs  a reason 
to decide; and advertising, which might stress a quite irrelevant or even 
purely  imagined  quality might  serve this need  (Akerlof  and Dickens 
1982, pp. 316 - 317). 
5.  In a  somewhat  different  theoretical  framework,  the  simplicity 
argument has been used in Schlicht (1979) with regard to the discussion 
about labour management vs. capitalist management in the theory of 
the firm: It has been  argued that an increase in firm-specific human 
capital formation induced by technological changes will lead to a de- 
crease in labour turnover. Hence it will become more natural to iden- 
tify the firm with the workers rather than with the capitalists. This 
induces the conviction among the workers that the firm is theirs rather 
than the property  of  anonymous  shareholders.  Hence  a  problem  of 
legitimacy  arises for the capitalist firm and the labour managed firm 
might  save costs of  conflict  avoidance, which might turn into a com- 
petitive advantage. 
4.3.  The Value of Freedom 
Consider a household faced with indifference curves and a budget set 
as in figure 1. 
commodity 2 t 
commodity 1 
Fig. 1: Indifferent curve I, budget  set B, and optimal consumption plan  C 
of  the household. 
23 See also  Albert (1965)  for a fundamental evaluation  of  Duesenberry's 
approach. Albert offers a research program in that important paper which is 
closely related to the present consideration. See  furthermore Schlicht (1975) 
for  an  application of  the  Duesenberry  approach  to  the  theory  of  wealth 
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From the point of  view of  welfare economics it is a matter of  indif- 
ference whether to give the individual the budget set B or to supply 
the commodity bundle C directly, since consumption will be C anyhow. 
However, from the point of  view of  cognitive dissonance theory, Figure 1 
depicts the individual's  preferences before it is endowed with the com- 
modity bundle. Afterwards, preferences will change, depending on the 
endowment process. The individual has more alternatives  if  it is en- 
dowed with the budget set B:  it could choose consumption A, for in- 
stance,  instead  of  consumption  C.  In order to  avoid  personal  incon- 
sistency, the individual will give more weight to the reasons favouring 
his actual choice C over the rejected  alternative B through  selective 
exposure to new information. This process would not take place if  the 
individual were offered only C and no other relevant alternative. Hence 
we conclude that the individual will feel happier ex post if  C has been 
chosen freely from the budget set. In this way, freedom increases wel- 
fare. If  seems to me that the argument highlights that traditional wel- 
fare economics misses  important  points  concerning economic welfare 
(a psychological concept) under different regimes. 
Remark on Reactance: There is an additional psychological argument 
pointing  in the same direction:  It has been found that an alternative 
increases in attractiveness if  it is taken away from the set of  feasible 
alternatives. This is the "reactance"  phen~menon~~.  Hence in the above 
example alternative A would appear more attractive if the individual 
were endowed directly with final consumption C instead of  the whole 
budget set. 
4.4.  Towards an Understanding of  Political Issues: An  Example 
In Germany we have a law which ties the level of  social insurance 
pensions to the prevailing wage income before taxes. Since income is 
taxed progressively  this  implies, however,  that  pensions  grow faster 
than wage incomes after taxes, and these pensions are not subject to the 
income tax. 
A financial crisis of  the system is predictable given the present data. 
In order to prevent it, there are two alternatives 
1.  The net wage concept (Nettolohnbezogene Rente): 
Social  insurance  pensions  are  to be  tied  to  wage  income  after 
t axesz. 
'24  It has not  found  a theoretical explanation up  to  now,  see  Irk (1975, 
pp.  372  -379).  Zimbardo (1969, p.  283) argues, however,  that  it  is  closely 
connected  to the pursuit of  cognitive consistency. 
25 An equivalent alternative would be to  subject pensions to the income 
tax  and  to  give  the additional lax receipts  as additional  subsidies  to the 
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2.  The gross wage concept (Bruttolohnbezogene Rente): 
Social insurance contributions are to be increased. 
The proponents of  the net wage concept argue that it is unfair that 
the net income of  the pensioneers  is growing faster than that of  the 
active population which produces what the pensioneers get. They view 
the system basically  as redistributing the produced  income among the 
active and the retired: They see it as a redistributive system (contract 
among generations, Generationenvertrag). 
On the other hand the gross wage concept is defended by saying that 
the social insurance contributions have been paid out of  gross wages 
which have been taxed already (rather than out of  net wages). Hence 
the social insurance contributions  have been  taxed  already,  and the 
net  wage  concept  would  imply  that  pensions  are taxed  twice.  This 
arugument rests on the interpretation of  the social insurance system 
as an insurance rather than a redistributive system. 
The  waves  of  the  discussion  about  these  alternatives  are  rather 
intense  at their peaks.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the present  con- 
siderations the political  issue can be explained by observing that the 
two principles of  redistribution and of  insurance are mixed up in the 
present system: The redistributive element is contained in the feature 
that pensions are tied to current wage income rather than to previous 
contributions, and the insurance element is present since social insur- 
ance contributions are collected. Hence a cognitive dissonance is built 
into the system: One can look at it both ways by viewing the one or 
the other feature as dominant and the remaining as accidental. People 
will look for additional reasons for making that decision by considering 
their personal advantage for instance26. 
Once  they  have made  up their  minds,  selective  exposure  to  new 
information will reconfirm their view and they will feel convinced of 
the view adopted and will argue that the opponents are selfishly pursu- 
ing their own advantage, disregard considerations of  justice  and fair- 
ness,  and  are putting  foreward  their  arguments  for  purely  tactical 
reasons. 
Hence  both parties  can be  convinced that  they  are  right  because 
their views are founded on the objective features of  the social insur- 
ance system, and the conflict  can be solved only  by additional argu- 
ments ,(like an empty cash-box) or by changing the system in the one 
26  This is also in accordance with the minimization of  cognitive dissonance 
since a decision  neglecting the personal advantage will  arouse dissonance 
unless adequate reasons can be  given for this discrepancy. 78  Ekkehart Schlicht 
or the other direction:  If  the social insurance system  were  financed 
through taxes directly, the gross wage concept would loose power;  if 
social  insurance  contributions  were financed  out  of  net  wages,  the 
result would be similar. On the other hand, the insurance view under- 
lying the gross wage concept would require that social insurance pen- 
sions are tied to past individual contributions and are independent of 
current wages. 
Note that the change e.g. from basing social insurance contributions 
on net wages rather than gross wages has no "real" effect if  the premia 
are changed accordingly, but the present  considerations would predict 
a substancial political impact of  such a move. 
This illustrates why arguments are important in politics: Arguments 
are important insofar as they are not merely value judgements  but are 
elaborating principles  implicit  in the status quo  and  applying  these 
principles to controversial issues27. 
This might  explain why  the interests of  certain  important  groups 
(like housewifes, for instance) have very little political weight, whereas 
other groups have extraordinary influence.  If  these  differences were 
merely a reflection of  economic influence, however, the job  of  the poli- 
ticians would not consist mainly in making speeches and reading papers, 
since these activities will not change the "real"  power  structure very 
much. This can only be explained by the aim of  establishing principles 
and render them powerful -  by tying them to what the world is like, 
by  rendering  them  relevant.  This seems to  me  to  be the  nature of 
political power28. 
4.5. Towards a New Anchorage for Welfare Economics? 
It is a hallmark of  traditional welfare economics to take preferences 
as exogeneously given. Furthermore all possible preferences are given 
equal weight. This is formalized by the "unrestricted domain" assump- 
tion. The argument underlying this is that of  "consumer's sovereignty": 
The consumer  himself  knows  best  what is  good  for  him.  Hence we 
should assume nothing in advance about preferences. 
The  unrestricted  domain  assumption  renders  welfare  economics 
rather sterile, however. This is documented by the the main results in 
27  See also SchZicht  (1979) on  the theory of  social norms. 
28  Lindblom's (1977) concept  of "authority" can be  understood as  a deri- 
vative  of  the above  considerations. To  take authority as  a primitive  con- 
cept, as  Lindblom  does, seems to  me  to  involve  difficulties regarding  the 
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this field: On the one hand the various impossibility theorems and the 
Gibbardisattlethwaite-Theorem stating the manipulability  of  all non- 
dictatorial collective choice rules granted the unrestricted domain as- 
sumption.  On the other hand all meaningful  welfare theorems make 
special ad hoc assumptions about preferences. The Pareto-optimality of 
general equilibrium is proved by assuming interdependent preferences 
away, for instance, and the recent attempts to circumvent the "liberal 
paradox"  rule out what they call "nosy"  preference^^^. 
Hence  a  theory  which  can say  something about  the formation  of 
preferences might give hints about what we reasonably might assume 
about the shape of  preferences: We are not forced to rely on our per- 
sonal tastes or value judgements when making assumptions about pref- 
erences nor to  rely  on  doubtful  ad-hoc  generalizations  of  empirical 
findings. (These generalizations are often doubtful because preferences 
are rather unstable in many cases. Hence we need to know the rules 
governing preference formation, i.e.  we ought to draw on social psy- 
chology.) 
In this vein, welfare economics might turn into an branch of  positive 
economics which is  concerned  with the actual  rather than  arbitrary 
preferences of  individuals. Value judgements  will  receive  their rele- 
vance not  from the  personal preferences  of  economists but  are con- 
sidered as empirical phenomena  generated by economic processes and 
governing these processes in turns0. 
In this way, the dichotomy between normative and positive science 
collapses:  Welfare  economics  is  turned  into  a  positive  science,  and 
theoretical  considerations  about the formation of  preferences contrib- 
ute to the understanding of  economic phenomenasl. 
In  addition,  and,  perhaps, more  importantly, the incorporation of 
psychological theories about preference formation might lead to a more 
adequate treatment of  the all-pervasive learning processes which escape 
the traditional framework and render the propositions of  welfare eco- 
nomics somewhat airy in the more interesting cases. Von  Weizsacker's 
(1971 a) analysis highlights this point. 
See Gaertner and Kriiger  (1982). 
30  I have developed the above programme in Schlichf  (1974). 
31  By  the way, this turn to psychological economics is in outspoken con- 
trast  to  the  earlier  "subjectivist  revolution"  in  economics  since  it  aims 
to  rely on  general rules about preference formation and to  get rid, in this 
way,  of  subjectivism. Both  approaches  are  psychological,  however,  since 
they  are tying values to  desires rather than trying to  determine objective 
values. 80  Ekkehart Schlicht 
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